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CONTRACTS, CAPABILITY, AND THE 
CLASSROOM 
James C. Oldham* 
THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW. By Richard 
Danzig. Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press. 1978. Pp. x, 
254. $6.25. 
Professor Danzig introduces his collection of readings on 
well-known contract cases with a pleasing metaphor. Most of 
traditional law school training, he says, deals with the engines of 
our legal system, their characteristics and values. But those en-
gines traverse a road that is often rutted and sometimes barely 
passable. Danzig states: "The machinery of Justice responds as 
much to the road as to the engine. This book is about the road" 
(p. 2). 
To describe the obstacles with which the road is strewn, Dan-
zig has fashioned the term "capability problems." Principally he 
investigates these problems in the courtroom and in the_ events 
leading up to and following litigation. They constitute the sys-
temic imperfections that deprive many individuals of access to 
the litigative process, that cause the process itselfto·go awry, and 
perhaps most importantly, that render courtroom victories 
pyrrhic because the judgments cannot be enforced. 
The pretrial imperfections are best illustrated in the final 
section of the book-Allen v. Quality Furniture (p. 205). That 
episode, which did not reach trial, graphically describes the hope-
less quagmire that can be encountered in striving to solve through 
the litigative process what would seem to be simple consumer 
problems. Appropriately, the supplementary comments to the 
section commence with a quote from Dicken's Bleak House. 1 
The testimonial problems in the courtroom are treated in 
Parts I and VI: Part I presents a malpractice suit and Part VI a 
• Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S. 1962, Duke University; L.L.B. 
1965, Stanford University; M.S.B.A. 1967, University of Denver.-Ed. · 
1. This is the Court of Chancery, which has its decaying houses and its 
blighted lands in every shire, which has its worn-out lunatic in every madhouse and 
its dead in every churchyard, which has its ruined suitor with his slipshod heels arid 
threadbare dress borrowing and begging through the round of every man's acquaint-
ance, which gives to monied might the means abundantly of wearying out the right, 
which so exhausts finances, patience, courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and 
breaks the heart, that there is not an honourable man among its practitioners who 
would not give-who does not often give-the warni~g, "Suffer any wrong that can 
be done you rather than come here!" [P. 223] 
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suit involving mental incapacity to enter into a contract.2 Post-
trial judgment collection problems are best illustrated in Parts II 
and V, cases dealing with injunctive relief on a convenant not to 
compete and collection under a contract tainted by illegality.3 
The rest of the book deals with the measurement and award of 
damages. To illustrate the problem of assessing damages, Danzig 
uses two universally familiar contract cases: Hadley u. Bax-
endale4 and Jacob & Youngs u. Kent. 5 
Except for the final section of the book (where the case did 
not generate a court opinion), Danzig's scheme is to present the 
reported appellate opinion in the case, to follow the report with 
"first questions," then to provide supplementary comments delv-
ing into the trial phase of the case or into background facts, and 
to conclude with "further questions." Although the quality and 
depth of the various studies are uneven, the concept of the book 
is an appealing one, especially when viewed as an augmentation 
to a standard casebook. 
Each of the case studies is interspersed with a variety of 
"capability problems." Sometimes these are quite simplistic-for 
example, the admonition that cases can be won or lost depending 
upon the quality of the lawyering. 6 At other times, the meaning 
is subtle-for example, the treatment of the reliance damage 
component in the O'Connor case,7 or the suggestion that capabil-
ity problems infect the analyses of the Chicago school of econom-
ics just as they do the litigation process. 8 At still other times, 
sweeping questions are posed which suggest the outlines of Hart 
and Sacks's materials on legal process.9 
Floating through these exercises is the repeated message that 
"the law in action will be different from the law on the books."10 
To imbue students with an appreciation of this message in some 
2. The cases are respectively, Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 
(1973); Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460, 303 
N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969). 
3. Respectively, Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 
(1955); Karpinski v. Collins, 252 Cal. App. 2d 711, 60 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1967). 
4. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
5. 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921). 
6. See, e.g., Further Questions 4, 5, and 8 following the Supplementary Comments 
to Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 679, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973) [at pp. 42-43). 
7. Further Question 5 (p. 43). 
8. See Further Question 3 following the Supplementary Comments to Hadley v. 
Baxendale (p. 107). 
9. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (Tent. Ed. 1958). 
10. The quote is Professor Danzig's paraphrase of a statement by Karl Llewellyn (p. 
2). 
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depth is surely Danzig's principal goal. 
Danzig may be saying merely, like Llewellyn and the legal 
realists, 11 that he is a "law school realist" and wants the law 
student to know the full contours of the game at an early stage. 
The impetus is the same as, or is similar to, the widespread move-
ment some years ago in contracts casebooks to start with reme-
dies.12 Danzig's theme, however, is more basic. He seeks to reveal 
the arbitrariness, the fortuities, the surprises, the obstacles, and 
the skills that attend the crystallization of events into litigation. 
He then observes the slips between cup and lip in the litigation 
process itself and the frequent disintegration of the achieved re-
sult. 
I have no quarrel with these objectives. My only worry is that 
the student not be demoralized completely. There really are law-
suits that succeed, just as there is occasionally successful, egali-
tarian legislation. Danzig asks the student to appraise an appel-
late judge's opinion in the first exercise and to assess whether it 
is "an over-subtle, pedantic, meaningless exercise" (p. 43). He 
then asks whether, if so, law school education can be similarly 
characterized, suffering as it is from an inbreeding of opinions of 
appellate judges selected in part by law professors (p. 43). These 
are legitimate questions, although they are hardly new ones. All 
who teach traditional casebook courses in the first year of legal 
education are conscious of the skewed impression left by the ex-
clusive attention to common-law cases-often bad ones, at that. 13 
The trouble is that Danzig, after raising this problem repeatedly, 
gives the student very little countervailing support. No rehabili-
tation of student morale is provided, other than the quixotic grat-
ifications reflected in the consumer fraud problem at the end of 
the book. The possibility emerges that Danzig is, in fact, an anti-
theorist, inviting students to conclude that contract doctrine is 
empty. Such a nihilist viewpoint would have been de rigueur a 
decade ago, but it is surprising and a little disappointing to en-
counter it from as fresh and spirited a member of the contracts 
11. See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE (1962); w. TwlNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE 
REALIST MOVEMENT (1974). 
12. For example, Professor Jackson proposes: "[B]y studying remedies first, a stu-
dent will learn to 'keep his eye on the ball', i.e., attention will be appropriately focused 
on the lawyer's end-goal of a result that predictably can be obtained if the transaction or 
relationship becomes subject to litigation." J. JACKSON, CONTRACT LAw IN MODERN Soc1ETY 
12 (1973). Danzig's materials, of course, put into question the predictability to which 
Jackson refers. 
13. See, e.g., Henderson, Book Review, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1466, 1467 (1976) (review-
ing C. REITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS AS BASIC COMMERCIAL LAw (1975)). 
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community as Professor Danzig.14 
Perhaps I overreact. After all, only a few years ago Danzig 
took Karl Llewellyn to task about what Danzig perceived to be 
the doctrinal and moral vacuity of Article II of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.15 Thus, Danzig's mission in his readings on con-
tracts cases may be limited to describing the inevitable tension 
between the artifice of theory and the reality of trial. In this, his 
materials are successful. 
Having unburdened myself about what I regard as the ·only 
truly disturbing feature of the book, I will turn to some of the 
specific case studies. In doing so, I will save the Hadley v. 
Baxendale piece until last, since that study stands apart in con-
siderable measure. 
The story of Alice Sullivan's cosmetic nose operations re-
flected in malpractice litigation captures the reader's attention 
quickly and provides a good opening case study. It is challenging, 
in that the supplementary comments invite the students' atten-
tion to the following: (1) the fact that the winning theory of the 
case was selected by the lawyers almost accidently; (2) the highly 
untheoretical recollections of jury members, whose decisions were 
frequently at odds with jury instructions or the weight of the 
evidence; (3) the difficulty in distilling clear facts from ambigu-
ous testimony; and (4) the extent to which testimonial expres-
sions in a courtroom are influenced by factors completely extra-
neous to the case. These topics could easily spawn many reflec-
tive· hours on the part of the student. Helping to channel and 
particularize this reflection are the "further questions," which 
are, on the whole, appropriately provocative. Occasionally, how-
ever, a further question is so broad that it may lose its utility. For 
example, Danzig instructs the student to do a legal autopsy on 
the Sullivan case and asks: "What lessons do you draw from [ the 
materials] that might be relevant to your performance as an 
attorney? What capability problems arise as a result of the vari-
14. Professor Henderson has recently noted that "[j]udging from the advance sheets 
and the casebook marketplace, there is as yet scant evidence that salvation for the con• 
tracts course lies in some form of antidoctrine." Id. at 1469. Supporting Professor Hender-
son's statement is Gilmore, Frederick Kessler, 84 YALE L.J. 672, 681 (1975). In that engag-
ing piece, Professor Gilmore lauds his colleague Kessler as "one of the very few men of 
his generation who, having decisively rejected the doctrinal orthodoxy of the period-the 
Restatement of Contracts and all that-seems never to have been tempted to go on to 
some form of antidoctrine as salvation." Id. Professor Gilmore observes, by the way, a 
resurgence of theoretical inquiry in the contracts literature during the 1970s. 
15. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 
STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975). 
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ance in lawyers' skills?" (p. 42). 
Sometimes this unproductive breadth of the questions filters 
into the "first questions" following the report of the appellate 
decision. I find this to be true of the qgestions following the sec-
ond case study, Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg. 16 Danzig directs 
the student to '.'imagine" all the capability problems inherent in 
the situation presented by the case. It will be the rare first-year 
student who can do it; most students will not have the speculative 
ability or the experience to be able to respond meaningfully. Stu-
dents can muse about the problems, to be sure, and such musings 
may be valuable in their way, but I think more helpful, particu-
larized questions could be fashioned. 17 
To my mind the case study which is the least effective is that 
dealing with Jacob & Youngs v. Kent. I do not find the supple-
mentary comments to be a particularly illuminating addition to 
the facts recited in the appellate opinion, and the "further ques-
tions" are little different from the standard series of questions one 
would pursue in analyzing Judge Cardozo's reasoning. 18 
To some extent the same is true of the Karpinski v. Collins19 
study (pp. 129-47). The supplementary comments comprise a 
nice story providing a background to the case, but few additional 
insights are contributed. It is valuable, however, to learn from the 
supplementary comments of the case how the collection of the 
judgment was encroached upon by the bankruptcy proceedings 
against the corporate entity operated by the defendants. · 
Danzig's treatment of Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement 
Board20 describes the occasion prompting the California Supreme 
Court to "modernize" its approach to mental incapacity as a 
basis for avoiding contractua;l obligations. I have taught the case 
three times, and it is a wonderful one for first-year students. 
16. 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955). 
17. To illustrate, the first part of Danzig's third question about Fullerton is as follows: 
"Criticize the rule of law articulated by the Supreme Court in terms of the capability 
problems it will encounter" (p. 42). Would it not be more helpful to particularize this? 
For example: How will the court in future cases be able to decide how much protection 
from competition a plaintiff 'needs'? What does 'need' mean? Should it be established 
under generally accepted accounting principles? How much of a hypothetical diminution 
in profits would be required? What type of proof will be adequate to establish the neces-
sary causal link between a future diminution in profits and a breach of a covenant not to 
compete? 
18. For an especially potent set of inquiries about the Cardozo opinion, one laced with 
excursions into the background of New York law, see F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS 
898-901 (1970). 
19. 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969). 
20. 252 Cal. App. 2d 711, 60 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1967). 
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Danzig's supplementary material, as in the Alice Sullivan case, 
highlights the contrast between murky testimony and the confi-
dent language and system of categorization in the appellate opin-
ion. 
The final selection in the book I have previously alluded 
to-Allen v. Quality Furniture Co. The facts are strikingly similar 
to those before Judge Skelly Wright in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 21 except that the Quality Furniture facts 
never reached a litigated conclusion. A simulated interview is 
effectively done, and Danzig does not fail to compare the honest, 
forthright testimony of the uneducated Mrs. Allen with that of 
the devious Alice Sullivan, the dull-witted Mr. Ortelere and the 
incapacitated Mrs. Ortelere (p. 221). Following the simulated 
interview is a descriptive piece by Phil Schrag, which derives 
from his experience as an attorney for the National Office for the 
Rights of the Indigent. The piece is gripping. Highly suspenseful, 
the episode cannot fail to be illuminating, even to the most street-
wise first-year law student. It is worthwhile to be privy to the 
formative stages of a test case, the strategy chosen, and the dis-
covery phase, particularly when the test case attacks some of the 
unsavory features of commercial-credit practices in Harlem. 
Whether the story belongs in a first-year contracts course is de-
batable but largely academic; the contracts course is as good a 
first-year setting as any. For me, the only troubling aspect of the 
episode, the book's final selection, is the same difficulty raised by 
the first selection-that the first-year student may have been 
unduly demoralized by contract th~ory. 
I come, finally, to Professor Danzig's analysis of Hadley u. 
Baxendale. Originally a legal history study,22 this chapter of Dan-
zig's book is elaborately analytical-far more so than the other 
case studies. It is true that Danzig's study of Hadley reveals 
forces shaping the result that are largely invisible to the contem-
porary reader of the reported case, and in this way, he is dealing 
with "capability problems" as he has defined them. But his chief 
mission is that of an historiographer. 
What Danzig does with Hadley is to examine the state of 
industrialization at the time of the case, to explore the character-
istics and backgrqund of the counsel in the case and of the judges 
deciding the case on appeal, and to suggest plausible hypotheses 
21. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
22. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the /,aw, 2 J. 
LEGAL 8nm. 249 (1975). 
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about why the case has loomed so large in contracts literature 
over the years. He also concludes that the case has outlived its 
importance. The insights provided the first-year law student by 
his analyses are valuable, both intrinsically and in terms of the 
importance of assessing a case in the context of the time and 
place in which it arose. 
There are, nevertheless, several features of the study which 
are troublesome. Danzig seems to go out of his way to quibble 
with Professor A.W.B. Simpson, a contracts historian at the 
University of Kent, Canterbury. At issue between Danzig and 
Simpson is who in the Hadley drama most clearly relied on civil-
law treatise writers, Pothier and Sedgwick in their approach to 
damages. This exercise, while perhaps common in papers by his-
torians striving for a correct interpretation of a historical event, 
seems out of place in these selected readings for contracts stu-
dents. 23 
In Part IV of his article on Hadley, Danzig attempts to dem-
onstrate that changes in the judicial system in England in the 
mid-1800s probably led to an increase in contracts litigation in 
the lowest courts-the county courts-which were courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction. Danzig suggests that it would follow that ques-
tions of damages in contracts cases became more important be-
cause of the need to fix a jurisdictional amount in controversy. 
The theory is interesting, although the proof offered in support 
of the theory is scant. With regard to the Hadley case, Danzig 
extends his theory as follows: 
By identifying the criteria by which damages were to be as-
sessed, the Hadley v. Baxendale court enhanced the predictability 
of damages and therefore the correct allocation of cases between 
the systems. Moreover, since the rule of the case coupled this en-
23. Even granting the appropriateness of the passage to this book, the content of the 
quarrel is peculiar. Danzig states that Professor Simpson was short-sighted in concluding 
that Baron Parke was the principal actor in the Hadley drama to consult the civil law. 
Baron Parke admitted his own reliance upon Sedgwick, but Danzig indicates that it 
"seems clear" that Baxendale's flamboyant counsel, Willes, also was familiar with and 
relied upon the civil-law writers (p. 83). This speculative conclusion is then transformed 
by Danzig into a "fact that Willes had read Pothier and especially Sedgwick" (p. 83). 
Professor Danzig next states what he regards as a more significant fault with Professor 
Simpson's thesis-that Simpson stops short in his analysis. Danzig suggests that Baron 
Parke's resort to the civil law must have been symptomatic of underlying dissatisfaction 
with the existing law, and Danzig searches for that underlying dissatisfaction. By this 
means, Danzig effects a smooth transition between Parts II and III of his article on Hadley, 
but perhaps he does so at the expense of Professor Simpson. There is no indication that 
Professor Simpson's goals in his references to Hadley were coextensive with Professor 
Danzig's. 
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hanced predictability with an assertion of limitations on recovery, 
it tended to shunt cases from the Superior Courts toward the 
County Courts and thus to protect the smaller system from at least 
a portion of the workload that if untrammelled would overwhelm 
it. [P. 93] 
I find this suggestion highly speculative. It is not supported 
by statistical evidence. The only statistics offered are that the 
county court caseload grew from 429,000 cases in 1846 to 754,000 
in 1857. This was a major· increase, to be sure, but it seems du-
bious to me that a significant impetus to the expansion was the 
1854 decision in Hadley, particularily given the time needed for 
Hadley to be felt in newly litigated cases. 
Two other aspects of Danzig's Hadley u. Baxendale article 
give me pause. First, in discussing the jury in Hadley, Danzig 
notes that nine of the twelve were merchants "who must have 
suffered frustration or injury from the then-frequent occurrence 
of carrier error," and thus that these merchants "probably sym-
pathized much more readily with the Hadleys than with Baxen-
dale" (p. 94). Admittedly a certain amount of dissatisfaction sur-
faced during the mid- and early 1800s with special juries com-
prised of m·erchants, dissatisfaction largely due to the allegation 
that the composition of special merchant juries was subject to 
unchecked manipulation. 24 There was considerable evidence to 
suggest that this practice was occurring,25 but presumably Baxen-
dale could play the game as well as the Hadleys-particularly 
given the skill of Baxendale's counsel, Willes (pp. 83, 97). Thus, 
I do not think it fruitful to surmise whether the jurors were likely 
to be more sympathetic to the Hadleys than to Baxendale. 
Secondly, Danzig evaluates the "notice" requirement of 
Hadley (that a breaching party will be responsible for special 
damages only if he was put on notice at the time the contract was 
entered into of the condition that might lead to such damages) 
and concludes that this feature of the case was, even when 
crafted, anachronistic. He points out that "in mass transaction 
situations a seller cannot plausibly engage in an individualized 
'contemplation' of the consequences of breach and a subsequent 
tailoring of a transaction" (p. 100). And Pickford's, the carrier, 
24. See, e.g., Bentham, On the Art of Packing Special Juries (1821), in 5 THE WORKS 
oF JEREMY BENTHAM 61 (1843); WooLER, AN APPEAL TO THE CmzENS OF LoNDON AGAINST 
THE ALI.EDGED LAWFUL MODE OF PACKING SPECIAL JURIES (1817). 
25. See, e.g., "Report of the Especial Committee to Examine the Books and Lists of 
Persons Qualified to Serve on Juries in and for the City of London," Common Council 
Minutes, 11 December 1817; "Report from the Select Committee on Special and Common 
Juries," House of Commons, 7 July 1868. 
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is described as an "enormous mercantile establishment" with 
innumerable departments working largely autonomously (p. 100). 
How much more so is this true today of corporate enterprise: Yet 
the law continually engages in "notice" requirements, indulging 
iii the fiction that a sprawling corporate entity has "knowledge" 
of and is therefore responsible for the acts of all its widely dissem-
ipated agents.26 Danzig states that the fragmented and standard-
ized nature of contemporary business makes it "self-evidently 
impossible to serve legally cognizable noti<!e on, for example, an 
airline that a scheduled flight is of special importance or the 
telephone company that uninterrupted service is particularly 
vital at a particular point in a firm's business cycle" (p. 101). Yet 
there continue to be cases of liability for special damages in trans-
mission of messages and like situations. n 
In fairness, Danzig does point out that the court's factual 
determination in Hadley that the defendant did not know that 
the mill was shut down may have been prompted by uncertainty 
in the law of agency. The court may have assumed that a "mere 
notice" to an agent could not bind the principal (p. 87). This 
doubt has long since disappeared, and perhaps had it disap-
peared prior to Hadley, the court would have been more con-
cerned about the implications of its "notice" requirement. 
Conclusion 
I have always told my contracts students that, like truth. the 
appearance of certainty in the law may be as important as cer-
tainty itself. Having scrutinized cases with them until the cases 
crumble under our gaze, we strive to pull back a bit to realize 
that, with the proper perspective, the subject matter is intact and 
reasonably well integrated. Danzig's book is, he says, about the 
ruts in the road which the contracts vehicle traverses. On the 
whole, Danzig develops his theme ably, and it is a perspective 
infrequently emphasized in law school. My caution is merely to 
remember that the road is passable, and while this may be in 
part due to the yielding nature of the obstacles described by 
26. A contemporary example under the Uniform Commercial Code is the machinery 
of§ 2-207, especially § 2-207(2)(c). Under that provision, a merchant may be bound by 
additional terms contained in the other party's expression of acceptance unless 
"notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable 
time after notice of them is received." 
27. See Judge Cardozo's discussion in Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 245 
N.Y. 284, 157 N.E. 140 (1927) and cases collected and discussed in A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs 
~§ 1018, 1076 (1964). 
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Danzig, it is due as well to the resilience and durability of the 
doctrinal engines. 
